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HELLER‘S FUTURE IN THE LOWER COURTS 
Glenn H. Reynolds* 
Brannon P. Denning** 
The Supreme Court has released its long-awaited opinion in District of 
Columbia v. Heller,1 and the buzz has been considerable.  Though much has 
been made of the majority‘s historic ruling and of the narrowness of that 
majority, many commentators have missed an important point.  What Hel-
ler is most notable for is its complete and unanimous rejection of the ―col-
lective rights‖ interpretation that for nearly seventy years held sway with 
pundits, academics, and—most significantly—lower courts. 
The repudiation of this extensive body of case law2 suggests that the 
real test of Heller will occur once the lower courts, traditionally hostile to 
an individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment, face the in-
evitable follow-up cases challenging other restrictive gun laws.  Experience 
with other seemingly groundbreaking Supreme Court decisions in recent 
years, such as United States v. Lopez, suggests that lower-court foot-
dragging may limit Heller‘s reach, though this time around there will likely 
be considerably more scrutiny and more vigorous litigation efforts. 
If the lower courts present a challenge to the implementation of Heller, 
they also provide litigants with an opportunity.  Given the fact that the Hel-
ler majority declined to give a detailed accounting of the proper standard of 
review to be used in subsequent Second Amendment cases, litigants have a 
rare opportunity to write on a tabula much more rasa than is ordinarily the 
case in constitutional litigation, making use of recent scholarship on the 
crafting of constitutional decision rules that implement constitutional provi-
sions. 
In the pages that follow, we take a look at these aspects of Heller.  The 
triumph of the Standard Model of the Second Amendment is examined in 
Part I.  Part II asks whether Heller is merely the opening volley in the com-
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  No. 07-290, slip op. (U.S. June 26, 2008) (link). 
2
  See Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of United 
States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961 (1996) (criticizing the case law cit-
ing United States v. Miller as authority for rejecting an individual rights interpretation). 
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tempt to rein in congressional power under the Commerce Clause, Heller 
will ultimately be seen as largely symbolic.  Finally, in Part III, we discuss 
the possibility that recent scholarship on constitutional doctrine might play 
a role in separating permissible from impermissible gun controls post-
Heller. 
I. INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS 
Pre-Heller discussions of the Second Amendment noted the conflict 
between an individual rights model in which the Amendment confers a right 
to arms on individual citizens, who are entitled to use the courts to resist in-
fringements in the same fashion as other constitutional rights such as free 
speech or privacy, and a collective rights model in which they are not.  Un-
der the formulation of this individual right arrived at by a large number of 
Second Amendment scholars (often referred to as the ―Standard Model‖ of 
Second Amendment individual rights interpretation), the right is not abso-
lute, but is extensive: ―[t]he purpose of the right to bear arms is twofold: to 
allow individuals to protect themselves and their families, and to ensure a 
body of armed citizenry from which a militia could be drawn, whether that 
militia‘s role was to protect the nation or to protect the people from a tyran-
nical government.‖3 
Set against this individual rights view was the so-called collective 
rights interpretation, under which the Second Amendment protects only the 
right of states to maintain an organized militia (often characterized as the 
modern-day National Guard) and gives rise to no judicially enforceable 
right to bear arms on the part of individuals.  This theory characterized vir-
tually all writing on the subject from the federal courts of appeals after the 
Supreme Court‘s 1939 opinion in United States v. Miller,4 though the Miller 
opinion itself did not adopt a collective rights approach.5  Under the collec-
tive rights theory, the Second Amendment, if it were susceptible to judicial 
enforcement at all, could only be invoked by a state government whose 
state militia was impaired by federal action.  Individuals, even those claim-
ing membership in a state‘s ―unorganized‖ militia, could not challenge fed-





  Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 475 
(1995), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=960788 (link). 
4
  307 U.S. 174 (1939); see, e.g., Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 923 (1st Cir. 1942) (stating 
that the Second Amendment was designed to foster ―the efficiency of the well regulated militia . . . as 
necessary to the security of a free state‖); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942) (stating 
that the Second Amendment ―was not adopted with individual rights in mind‖). 
5
  See Brannon P. Denning and Glenn H. Reynolds, Telling Miller‘s Tale: A Reply to David Yassky, 
65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. Spring 2002, at 113, available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?65+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+113+(Spring+2002) (discussing 
holding in Miller in light of briefs and arguments) (link). 
6
   ―Unorganized‖ militia, by statute, designate able-bodied males within a certain age range as 
members.  Unorganized militia are contrasted with the ―select‖ militia of a state, which correspond 
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Shortly after Miller was decided, federal courts of appeals began to 
overread it and to cite it for the proposition that only arms borne with the 
intent of participating in or contributing to the efficacy of a militia were 
protected.7  These courts essentially equated the Miller Court‘s refusal to 
hold that a sawed-off shotgun was protected by the Second Amendment 
with a refusal to recognize any individual right under the Amendment that 
was not, first and foremost, concerned with the maintenance of an orga-
nized and government-regulated military body.8 
Subsequent courts went further, stating that Miller held that the Second 
Amendment did not guarantee an individual right.9  Reading those opinions 
closely, however, it is clear that many simply relied on what other courts 
had said about Miller, and some judicial characterizations of Miller‘s facts 
are so inaccurate that it is difficult to believe that the judge writing the opi-
nion could have actually read the Miller decision itself.10  Lower court dis-
cussions of Miller resembled a game of judicial Telephone, with the actual 
holding of Miller becoming less and less recognizable as the years pro-
gressed.  Prior to Heller, only the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Emerson11 
held that the Second Amendment creates an individual right, although it 
found the right was not violated by the facts at hand. 
II. THE LOWER COURTS AND THE HELLER DECISION 
It is impossible to review the Second Amendment jurisprudence from 
the federal courts of appeals (excepting only Parker v. District of Colum-
bia,12 the lower-court version of Heller, and United States v. Emerson) 
without noting two things: a significant hostility toward individual rights 
                                                                                                                           
roughly to the state‘s National Guard.  See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2000) (classifying the able-bodied 
male population aged 17–45 as the unorganized militia of the United States) (link). State rules are simi-
lar, except that many states include women. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 48-904(e) (1983) 
(―‗[U]norganized militia‘ means all able-bodied male and female persons between the ages of 16 and 50 
years.‖); Ohio Const. art. IX, § 1 (1994) (authorizes ―all citizens‖ to serve); Or. Rev. Stat. § 396.105(3) 
(1994) (―The unorganized militia shall consist of all able-bodied residents of the state between the ages 
of 18 and 45 who are not serving in any force of the organized militia or who are not on the state retired 
list and who are or who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States; subject, 
however, to such exemptions from military duty as are created by the laws of the United States.‖). 
7
  See Denning, supra note 2, at 981–87 (discussing early cases applying Miller). 
8
  See, e.g., Cases, 131 F.2d at 923; Tot, 131 F.2d at 266; Denning, supra note 2, at 981–87 (discuss-
ing Cases and Tot).  But see District of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290, slip op. at 49–50 (U.S. June 26, 
2008) (―It is entirely clear that the [Miller] Court‘s basis for saying that the Second Amendment did not 
apply was not that the defendants were ‗bear[ing] arms‘ not ‗for . . . military purposes‘ but for ‗nonmili-
tary use‘ . . . .  Rather, it was that the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment 
protection . . . .  Beyond that, the opinion provided no explanation of the content of the right.‖). 
9
  See Denning, supra note 2, at 988–98 (discussing lower court cases). 
10
  See id. at 997–98 (discussing Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
11
  270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001). 
12
  478 F.3d 370, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding ―that the Second Amendment protects an indi-
vidual right to keep and bear arms‖), aff’d sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290 (June 29, 
2008). 
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arguments, and a surprisingly deep investment in their own case law, de-
spite its rather tenuous anchor in the Supreme Court‘s decisions.  This rais-
es the question: what will they do when presented with gun-rights cases 
post-Heller? 
There is some reason to expect that the answer will be ―not much.‖  
The last constitutional revolution led by the Supreme Court—via its Lopez 
and Morrison13 decisions limiting Congressional power—essentially petered 
out in the face of lower-court resistance.14  In light of Gonzales v. Raich,15 
which upheld the application of federal drug control laws to local, non-
commercial, medical marijuana, lower court reluctance to read Lopez and 
Morrison looked prescient.  Will that happen again with the Second 
Amendment? 
In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun Free School Zones 
Act as being in excess of Congress‘s enumerated power to regulate com-
merce among the several states.  In the years following Lopez, hundreds of 
cases flooded the lower courts, most brought by defendants convicted of vi-
olating various federal criminal statutes, claiming that those laws also ex-
ceeded Congress‘s commerce power.16  In the five years after Lopez, 
however, only one law—the civil suit provision eventually invalidated in 
Morrison—was struck down by a federal appellate court.17  Even after Mor-
rison, when the Court not only reaffirmed Lopez but seemed to add, ―and 
we mean it,‖ courts were still reluctant to rigorously analyze federal statutes 
using the Lopez-Morrison framework.  Though before Raich signaled a re-
treat, lower courts were beginning to uphold as-applied challenges to par-
ticular federal statutes.18 
Will Heller suffer Lopez’s fate, serving more as casebook fodder than 
as actual authority?  On the surface, there are some analogies between the 
Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment that suggest that, like Lo-
pez, Heller itself may end up as so much sound and fury, signifying noth-





  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil-suit provision of the Vi-
olence Against Women Act as beyond Congress‘s commerce power) (link). 
14
  See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the 
Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came? 2000 WIS. L. REV. 369 (2000) [he-
reinafter Reynolds & Denning, Constitutional Revolution]; Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, 
Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 
ARK. L. REV. 1253 (2003) [hereinafter Denning & Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance] (discussing lower 
court cases following Morrison). 
15
  545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding application of the Controlled Substances Act to noncommercial 
marijuana grown and possessed for local, medicinal use under state law) (link). 
16
  Several of these challenges are discussed in Reynolds & Denning, Constitutional Revolution, su-
pra note 14. 
17
  Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff’d 
sub. nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
18
  See Denning & Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance, supra note 14 (describing these as-applied 
challenges). 
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First, there are the institutional prejudices of the courts of appeals, fa-
voring the status quo and possessing a desk-clearing mentality.  Like the 
bureaucrats they increasingly resemble, the members of the appellate judi-
ciary do not like to rock the boat.  In addition, the courts of appeals have a 
history of more-or-less open hostility to claims of a private right to arms.  
The vast majority of cases to date suggest that, to the extent they can, they 
will try to rule against such a right. 
Second, as was true following Lopez, there are few federal firearms 
laws that are vulnerable under Heller.  Indeed, Justice Scalia‘s opinion took 
some pains to make clear what the Court was not calling into question: 
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohi-
bitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.19 
Indeed the very enumeration of ―presumptively lawful regulatory 
measures‖ seemed calculated to reduce expectations among, for example, 
felons convicted of possessing firearms in violation of federal law that Hel-
ler represented a ―Get Out of Jail Free‖ card. 
Third, the Heller majority‘s refusal to be pinned down on a specific 
standard of review might also leave an opening for lower courts to confine 
Heller to its facts.20  For example, a court might read Heller as standing for 
the proposition that anything less than an absolute ban could pass muster.  
Even if a reviewing court adopts the kind of intermediate standard of review 
urged by the Solicitor General,21 it might simply apply the standard in a way 
that defers to governmental judgments about the necessity of regulation.  A 
more explicit articulation of the standard to be employed could have discou-
raged lower court evasion of Heller, or at least made such evasion some-
what easier to detect, if the Court was inclined to monitor lower courts for 
compliance, something that it did not do following Lopez.22 
Fourth, because the majority preemptively (perhaps ―peremptorily‖ is a 





  District of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290, slip op. at 54–55 (U.S. June 26, 2008) (link).  A foot-
note added, for good measure, that the Court‘s list of ―these presumptively lawful regulatory measures . . 
. does not purport to be exhaustive.‖  Id. at 55 n.26. 
20
  See id. at 63 (―[S]ince this case represents this Court‘s first in-depth examination of the Second 
Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field . . . .‖). 
21
  Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, District of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290, at 8–9 
(2008) (recommending remand for analysis using intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review), 
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/us-heller-brief-1-11-08.pdf 
(link). 
22
  Whatever one thinks of the substance of his test or how well that test implements the right guar-
anteed by the Second Amendment, Justice Breyer at least described in some detail the approach he 
would take.  See Heller, No. 07-290, slip op. at 8–12 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the ―interest-
balancing‖ approach he would employ in Second Amendment cases). 
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would not be called into question by Heller,23 the most promising targets—
local gun bans similar to the District‘s and restrictive state gun laws—lie 
beyond the immediate scope of Heller because the Second Amendment re-
mains outside those provisions of the Bill of Rights that have been incorpo-
rated through the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to states.24  Thus, the 
true test of Heller‘s reach will turn on whether the Court will be willing to 
entertain one of the proliferating number of cases challenging these laws.25  
If the Court does not, then, like Lopez, Heller may end up having all the ro-
bustness of a ―but see‖ cite.26 
On the other hand, there are several important differences that ought 
not be overlooked between the situation following Lopez and that likely to 
follow Heller.  Perhaps most important is the fact that there was virtually no 
coordinated follow-up litigation to Lopez on the part of the public interest 
bar.  Most of the litigation was opportunistic: Lopez was cited in just about 
every appeal on behalf of those convicted of federal criminal offenses, who, 
as a group, rarely present the most sympathetic face.  By contrast, several 
lawsuits were filed challenging gun control laws in other communities with-
in hours of the Heller opinion‘s publication.27  Given the stakes, interest 
groups challenging local laws have greater incentive than individual crimi-
nal defense attorneys to ensure that only the best cases with the cleanest 
facts are brought. 
Moreover, there was relatively little public interest in Lopez or the 
Commerce Clause.  The Second Amendment, on the other hand, is among 
the most significant provisions of the Bill of Rights from the standpoint of 
public engagement.28  The public interest groups sponsoring follow-up liti-
gation will have every incentive to publicize lower court attempts to evade 
or blunt the effect of Heller and can try to choose cert-worthy cases from 





  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
24
  United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (refusing to apply the First and Second Amend-
ments to the states) (link).  For Heller‘s discussion of Cruikshank and its continued significance in light 
of the Court‘s incorporation of most provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states, see Heller, No. 07-290, 
slip op. at 47–49 & nn.22–23. 
25
  The majority did drop a pointed note that the case first declining to apply the Second Amendment 
to the states ―also said that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did not engage in 
the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases.‖  Id. at 48 n.23. 
26
  Cf. John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 174, 176 (1998) (―Whether Lopez marks a dramatic shift in Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence or is instead destined to be a ‗but see‘ citation remains to be seen.‖). 
27
  See, e.g., Maura Dolan, The 2nd Amendment: Reaction to the Court Ruling, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 
2008, at A19, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-legal27-
2008jun27,0,3173451.story (link). 
28
  See Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Believes Americans Have Right to Own Guns, GALLUP, Mar. 27, 
2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/105721/Public-Believes-Americans-Right-Own-Guns.aspx (―A solid 
majority of the U.S. public, 73%, believes the Second Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the 
rights of Americans to own guns.‖) (link). 
102:406  (2008) Heller‘s Future in the Lower Courts 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/23/ 412 
officials will have an incentive to monitor lower court implementation of 
Heller. 
It is also possible that the lower courts‘ hostility to an individual right 
to arms was largely a product of the zeitgeist of an earlier era, carried for-
ward as much by habit and stare decisis as by any institutional interest.  
With the individual right theory of the Second Amendment now not only 
endorsed by the Supreme Court, but also, thanks to extensive scholarship, 
academically respectable (and, of course, popular with a very large majority 
of citizens) it may be that today‘s federal judiciary will be less hostile to the 
right than past courts. 
A related point is that lower court judges may perceive the stakes diffe-
rently in Heller than they did in Lopez.  Following Lopez to its logical con-
clusions suggested rethinking the foundations of the modern New Deal 
state, if not mandating the unwinding of that state.  At the very least, it pre-
sented an opportunity for hundreds of criminal defendants to escape the 
consequences of their convictions.  Neither was an appealing option for 
even the most ardent advocate for limiting federal power, so judges stre-
nuously resisted following Lopez wherever it might lead—especially if it 
meant revisiting the constitutional legitimacy of statutes like the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.  By contrast, even reading Heller for all that it is worth, it is 
clear that significant regulations of private firearms ownership—including 
various licensing regimes—are not necessarily presumptively unconstitu-
tional. 
Finally, despite the unanimity of the Court in its conclusion that the 
Second Amendment protected some individual right, the alternative limiting 
implementations of that right were expressed as dissents, as opposed to par-
tial concurrences.29  Thus, there are not any narrow concurring opinions 
whose authors essentially control the outcome of future cases; the alterna-
tive approaches of the dissenters are, well, dissents.  Imagine a situation, 
though, in which Justice Breyer‘s ―interest-balancing‖ approach was a con-
curring opinion; lower courts seeking to limit Heller might choose Justice 
Breyer‘s standard of review in the absence of anything definite in the ma-
jority opinion.30 
In Lopez, for example, though the Court listed a number of factors 
bearing on whether a given local activity ―substantially affected‖ interstate 
commerce or not, the Court did not make clear whether all factors had to be 





  See, e.g., Heller, No. 07-290, slip op. at 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id., slip op. at 1 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Breyer seems to be feeling his way toward some sort of ―undue burden‖ standard, 
though it is more of an ―undue-burden-lite‖ standard, as it is difficult to imagine him upholding a ban on 
abortion in the District of Columbia on the basis that one could reach a friendlier jurisdiction for the 
price of a subway ticket.  See id. at 30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (―The adjacent states do permit the use of 
handguns for target practice, and those States are only a brief subway ride away.‖). 
30
  Likewise, Justice Stevens‘s primary dissent is, if anything, less clear than Justice Scalia‘s majori-
ty opinion on the appropriate standard of review.  By contrast, Justice Breyer‘s dissent is quite detailed. 
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ing that regulated activity had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  
In response, many lower court judges interpreted the opinion narrowly.  The 
presence of any factor distinguishing the statute under review from the Gun 
Free School Zones Act was deemed sufficient to turn back the constitution-
al challenge.31 
Which set of forces will prevail?  It‘s impossible to say for certain, so 
we‘ll equivocate and say, ―it depends.‖  Bureaucrats tend to take the path of 
least resistance, and least controversy.  Though some foot-dragging is like-
ly, it‘s equally likely that the kind of resistance demonstrated in response to 
Lopez won‘t manifest itself in response to Heller, as such resistance would 
likely produce far more controversy. 
III. HELLER AND DECISION RULES 
Because of its reticence on the subject, Heller presents litigants with an 
opportunity to sell lower courts on a standard of review largely unencum-
bered by binding precedent.  Subsequent litigation, then, might be a good 
test subject for examining the role that ―decision rules‖ play in the ―imple-
mentation‖ of constitutional rights.32  Given the considerable discretion that 
courts have in fashioning rules to implement constitutional guarantees,33 and 
the variety of doctrinal tests the Court has employed over the years to en-
force various constitutional provisions,34 it is clear that older discussions 
framing the choice as between individual rights/strict scrutiny vs. states‘ or 
collective rights/rational basis embodied a false choice. 
As scholars such as Adam Winkler, and the Solicitor General‘s brief 
made clear, recognition of an individual right does not doom all gun control 
regulations to constitutional oblivion.35  Subsequent litigation offers an op-
portunity for litigants to educate lower courts about the choices they have 
and offer the guidance the Court declined to provide about crafting rules 
that implement the guarantee Heller recognized.  Scholars, too, have an op-





  See Reynolds & Denning, Constitutional Revolution, supra note 14, at 385–91 (discussing several 
such cases). 
32
  What one of us has elsewhere called the ―new doctrinalism‖ is concerned with judicial generation 
of rules that implement or enforce constitutional meaning.  See generally Brannon P. Denning, The New 
Doctrinalism in Constitutional Scholarship and District of Columbia v. Heller, 75 TENN. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2008); KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 22–36 (2006); Mitchell N. 
Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004) (link); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 76–101 (2001). 
33
  See, e.g., ROOSEVELT, supra note 32, at 23–36; Berman, supra note 32, at 92–100 (describing 
factors influencing choices of decision rules). 
34
  See FALLON, supra note 32 at 77–79 (listing ―A Catalogue of Constitutional Tests‖). 
35
  See generally Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683 
(2007); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 21.  But see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 
Guns and Gay Sex: Some Notes on Firearms, the Second Amendment, and “Reasonable Regulation”, 75 
TENN. L. REV. 137 (2007) (comparing ―reasonable regulation‖ in Second Amendment context to reason-
able regulation in the context of the Supreme Court‘s unenumerated rights jurisprudence). 
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and judges agree is far too rare. 
This will be especially true of cases involving state and local restric-
tions—laws whose constitutionality was not squarely presented in Heller.  
Litigants ought to study and develop responses to Justice Breyer‘s ―interest-
balancing‖ standard of review.  Likewise, those defending existing or pro-
posed gun controls—especially those that do not go as far as the District‘s 
did—have another opportunity to argue against categorical rules and pre-
sumptions of unconstitutionality.  In truth, this is probably the debate that 
we should have been having all these years: which regulations of private 
firearms are the ―reasonable‖ ones that most people—including most of 
those who support an individual rights reading of the Second Amend-
ment—can support.  At the very least, the Court‘s interring of the ―collec-
tive rights‖ or ―military purpose‖ interpretation of the Second Amendment 
has cleared the way for that debate to begin. 
CONCLUSION 
Though the civics-book formulation provides that the Supreme Court 
establishes clear principles which lower courts should conscientiously ap-
ply, reality is considerably more complex and frequently less satisfying.  
Unfortunately, as many lawyers can attest, the Supreme Court often formu-
lates principles that are not clear, and sometimes it fails to establish prin-
ciples at all.  Lower courts, meanwhile, are not always conscientious in 
following the Supreme Court‘s lead, whether for reasons of bureaucratic ri-
gidity or because they have their own agendas.  Given the Supreme Court‘s 
light caseload, and the enormous number of cases in the lower courts, the 
path taken by the federal judiciary can diverge considerably from that estab-
lished by the Supreme Court.36 
Will Heller be such a case?  As we have noted before, this depends—
upon the behavior of litigants, upon the predilections of lower court judges, 
and upon the degree and nature of scrutiny that the process receives.  For 
us, at least, it offers an opportunity to continue our study of how Supreme 
Court precedent influences lower courts in an entirely new context, for 





  See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Looking Ahead: October Term 2007, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 335, 
350–52 (describing the Supreme Court‘s reduced influence on federal courts of appeals). 
